The Union government’s stand before the Supreme Court of India that the Constitution does not mandate judicial representation in the appointment of Election Commissioners raises a fundamental question about the nature of institutional independence in a parliamentary democracy. By arguing that the inclusion of the judiciary is merely a legislative choice, the Centre has asserted Parliament’s primacy under Article 324 of the Constitution of India. While this position is legally tenable, it also shifts the debate from constitutional necessity to democratic propriety—what ought to be done to preserve public trust in electoral institutions.
The replacement of the Chief Justice of India with a Union Cabinet minister in the selection committee under the 2023 law has intensified concerns about executive dominance. The government’s claim that independence flows from constitutional safeguards—such as tenure security and removal protections—is valid on paper. However, the credibility of institutions like the Election Commission of India depends not only on structural guarantees but also on the perception of neutrality. In a politically charged environment, even the appearance of imbalance in appointments can erode public confidence, regardless of the individual merit of appointees.
Ultimately, the issue is less about strict constitutional interpretation and more about strengthening democratic conventions. The judiciary’s earlier intervention in the Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India case reflected a concern for insulating the appointment process from excessive executive influence, at least as an interim safeguard. While Parliament is within its rights to legislate differently, it must also weigh the long-term implications for institutional credibility. In a democracy, trust is as critical as legality—and preserving that trust requires not just adherence to the letter of the law, but sensitivity to its spirit.