Beijing, May 30:
China’s approach to global conflicts is not aimed at ending them all but at determining which remain strategically useful and which pose strategic risks. Ukraine, in this context, is seen as useful to Beijing as it diverts Western attention and increases Russia’s dependence. By contrast, tensions around the Strait of Hormuz and North Korea’s alignment with Moscow are viewed as increasingly dangerous given their implications for energy security and China’s core geopolitical interests.
Taiwan stands apart as an existential issue tied directly to Beijing’s legitimacy and the broader United States–China rivalry. “The most important diplomatic signal of the past fortnight was not the choreography of Donald Trump’s summit with Xi Jinping, nor Vladimir Putin’s arrival in Beijing days later. It was the contradiction between them. China wants to look like the indispensable power in both rooms. It wants Trump to recognise that no global settlement is possible without Beijing. It wants Putin to understand that Russia has no better strategic rear than China,” Sergio Restelli, an Italian political advisor, author and geopolitical expert, wrote in the ‘Times of Israel’.
“It wants Tehran, Pyongyang and Islamabad to know that China has channels where others have slogans. But beneath the grandeur, Beijing’s message is becoming clearer: it does not want a world in flames. It wants leverage, not disorder. It wants dependency, not escalation. It wants the status quo, adjusted in China’s favour, but not blown apart,” he added.
At the recent Trump-Xi summit in Beijing, Restelli said Taiwan emerged as the most contentious issue. Xi warned that if the matter were “handled poorly”, China and the US could “collide or even enter into conflict”, warning that ties could move into an “extremely dangerous place”. Yet at the same meeting, Xi remarked on the US-China relationship, saying, “We must make it work and never mess it up.”
This reflects what the expert described as the Chinese approach in miniature—’Red lines must be asserted.’ But systemic rupture must be avoided.” Emphasising that the same logic extends to the Strait of Hormuz, Restelli said, “China is Iran’s most important oil customer and a major buyer of Gulf energy.”
It has no interest in a precedent where the United States dictates terms in the Gulf. But it has even less interest in a prolonged closure of the world’s most sensitive energy artery.” Restelli noted that the strategic calculation may push Beijing towards an implicit bargain – “freeze Ukraine, reopen Hormuz, restrain Pyongyang, keep Russia dependent, and manage Trump through trade and spectacle”.
Highlighting the wider implications, he said that this would not amount to a new world order but rather an old imperial habit pursued by China of stabilising frontiers, preserving leverage, and calling it peace.